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ABSTRACT 
This internship report discusses the impact of postmodem thought on the counselling 
process, and some of its implications for ethics, theory, and practice. Postmodern 
thought rejects the dominant modernist paradigms of empiricism and of universal codes 
or meta-narratives. It challenges the objectivity of the diagnosing clinician, arguing that 
the practitioner decides what may qualify as significant in advance of the client's 
particular story. Client and their stories are interpreted as Texts; client and counsellor 
variously share the roles of Author and Reader in a collaborative process of disclosing or 
creating meaning. It is argued that this is undermined in traditional practice by the notion 
of therapeutic distance or professional boundaries, which describe and quantify power 
relationships. Postmodern thought is sufficiently congruent with certain counselling 
models that some writers have challenged its contributions and even its novelty. In 
particular, it emphasizes epistemological and ethical reasons for the counselling process 
to be respectful, collaborative, and non-hierarchical with regard to perceived power 
relationships. The report goes on to discuss, from a process perspective, the author's 
lived experience of an ethical dilemma as a novice counsellor. The author was faced with 
a conflict between various ethical directives in terms of how to address the problem; in 
addition, actual theoretical models appeared to diverge in their interpretation of whether 
the challenge existed within the purview of the counsellor or outside it. Arising from this 
is a discussion of the dilemma as consistent with modernist codes of practice. These 
codes appear to have certain blind spots. While literature exists that documents and 
quantifies violations of professional codes, there appear to be few fora in while ethical 
struggles may be discussed. Gender issues may impact this as well, as traditional roles 
appear to limit support and dialogue. The author was not able to access appropriate 
guidance or discussion to address this dilemma, in counselling literature or through peer 
consultation; it is not clear that plans for addressing such issues had been developed, or a 
need identified. This may suggest a vestigial modernist theme in how counsellor 
evaluate, characterize, and address their own struggles. One perspective on postmodem 
ethics suggests that self-examination is an appropriate ethical tool and stance, as opposed 
to a modernist adherence to any universal moral code. 
PART ONE: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
1. Chapter One: Definitions 
a. What is Postmodernism? 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1995) defines 'postmodem' as: 
" ... relating to a complex set of reactions to modem philosophy and its 
presuppositions, rather than to any agreement on substantive doctrines or 
philosophical questions. Despite there being little agreement on what the 
presuppositions of modem philosophy are, and despite the disagreement on which 
philosophers exemplify these presuppositions, postmodem philosophy typically 
opposes foundationalism, essentialism, and realism." (pp. 634-5). 
It is useful, therefore, to consider that some have chosen to characterize postmodem 
thought as not so much a reaction to modernism, but rather a collection of what has been 
rejected by, or lost due to, the development of modernist philosophy. 
b. Features of the Modern 
What, then, is understood by the 'modernism' that is preceded, eclipsed, or rejected? 
In the daily context of my work in counselling, assessment, or teaching, I have tended to 
equate the modem- in a no doubt inexcusably reductionist manner- with the 'medical 
model' which defined most of psychological practice through the 1950's, and which 
arguably continues to represent the strongest influence in most areas of counselling 
practice today. When I speak of this 'medical model', I mean a tendency to understand 
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psychological diagnosis and treatment as prescriptive and even perfunctory, involving an 
emphasis on assessment criteria and more importantly a clear professional boundary 
between patient and practitioner. In this relationship it is understood that virtually all 
power, knowledge, and expertise rest with the counsellor. The counsellor has the license 
to define the relationship, as well as the clients' various concerns or difficulties. The 
practitioner is ultimately answerable to local and larger bodies which exert a similar 
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power over her or his practice, and which are broadly reactionary. I must clarify that I 
am not aware that any practitioners, professional organizations, or licensing bodies can be 
fairly described in the foregoing terms; I regard this rather as the specter of modernism 
which may at times emerge in our attitudes. In diagnosis there is perhaps an implicit 
suspension of any doubt in our own terms, observations, and insights, the tools with 
which we have equipped ourselves, and the fidelity to reality of the empirical model 
itself. 
The Literacy Dictionary (Harris & Hodges, 1995) defines modernism as "an artistic 
and literary movement culminating in post-World War I Europe, the United States, and 
Canada that discovers or creates alternatives to Western values". It is described as 
emphasizing 'novelty' and 'experiment'. Modernism itself is properly used in the artistic 
or literary sense to include a variety of movements, such as Symbolism, Expressionism, 
and Surrealism, which were themselves characterized by their rejection of earlier, 
primarily 19th -century, systems of valuation and interpretation. (Baldick, 1995, p. 140). 
Jurgen Habermas characterized it thus: 
''The epochal new beginning that marked the modem's world's break with the world 
of the Christian Middle Ages and antiquity is repeated, as it were, in every present 
moment that brings forth something new. The present perpetuates the break with the 
past in the form of a continual renewal," (Habermas, 1989, p. 48). 
c. Features of the Postmodern 
I will review briefly some of the largely accepted key features of postmodernism, 
with a view to giving the reader some sense of the implications of a postmodem stance. 
It may become quickly clear that the attitude of postmodem analysis is to resist 
definitions and characterizations in general (Baldick, 1995, p. 174)- therefore to define it 
through terms rather than processes or emerging dialogues is itself problematic, 
contradictory, and modernist. As one dictionary observes, "Besides, post-modernism is 
still happening. When something else develops from it or instead of it, it will, perhaps, 
be easier to identify, describe, and classify." (Cuddon, 1977, pp. 733-4). Adopting the 
example of others (Audi, 1995, & Rosenau, 1992), therefore, I will attempt not to define 
postmodemism, but to delineate what it is not. 
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Postmodernism is anti-epistemological (Rosenau, 1992, pp. xiii-xiv). In other words, 
it rejects knowledge as an abstract field of study, where its origins, limits, and 
fundamental nature are investigated as abstractions (such as the conflict between 
induction and deduction as ways of knowing). In lieu of this, it regards knowledge as 
emergent consent, an inter-subjective process, so that 'knowledge' as an abstraction is 
rejected in favour of 'knowing' some one thing in a specific context. 
Postmodernism is anti-essentialist (Audi, 1995, p. 635). Objects and ideas do not 
have an absolute or inherent nature or meaning. No quality is a necessary component of 
a given subject; in philosophical terms, properties are accidental rather than essential. All 
nature, all meaning are evolving products of context. The corollary of this is that 
meaning is reduced to message; images and communications are literally superficial: 
existing only on the surface. 
Postmodernism is anti-realist (Audi, 1995, p. 635). It opposes the notion that 
qualities such as blueness or fairness exist exclusive of given things that are blue or fair. 
In philosophical terms, this stance that only particulars exist is called nominalism, and its 
implications are sweeping. For example, it can be taken to mean for the purposes of 
counselling that there is no such thing as 'depression', there is rather only a set of 
individuals who are depressed. 
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Postmodernism is anti-foundationalist (Audi, 1995, p. 635; Rosenau, 1992, p. xi). 
The meanings of events or statements are subjective. While said events or statements are 
real- all of them- they can't be described or evaluated in any language that all 
reasonable subjects would accept. 
Postmodernism rejects knowledge as reflective of reality (Audi, 1995, p. 634). 
Postmodernism rejects truth as reflective of reality (Audi, 1995, p. 634). 
Postmodernism rejects sweeping or all-inclusive categories, narratives, and systems 
(Rosenau, 1992, pp. xii-xiii). 
Postmodernism rejects being characterized as relativistic, skeptical, or nihilistic 
(Audi, 1995, p. 634). 
Postmodernism is ironic. That is to say, language and images used in post-modern 
discourse tend to be employed in senses which have double (or multiple) signifying 
power, or one signifier and two (or more) signifieds (Hutcheon, 1992, p.32). This is a 
conventional definition of verbal irony, "literally saying one this and figuratively 
meaning the opposite" (Sperber & Wilson, 1981, p. 295). This ironic stance is calculated 
to undermine the Reader's sense of complacency or uncritical certainty: 
"it is a self-conscious mode that senses the failure of all sophisticated 
conceptualizations; stylistically, it employs rhetorical devices that signal real or 
feigned disbelief on the part of the author toward the truth of his own statements ... " 
(Marcus & Fischer, 1986, p. 13). 
Irony's stance of feigned disbelief, and its reliance on the critical stance of the 
Reader, is ideologically consistent with Lyotard's definition of the "postmodern as 
incredulity toward metanarratives" (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv). Fredric Jameson puts the 
matter more succinctly; it is "an imitation that mocks the original" (Jameson, 1983, p. 
113). 
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These are among the more common descriptions and criticisms of the postmodern 
stance. While it is not intended that this report wander into the deeper landscape of 
critical theory or late 20th-century philosophy, imperfectly understood by this writer in 
any event, it is perhaps useful to discuss this equation of post-modernism with post-
structuralism. "It also refers to a critical position in criticism, in which a complete 
relativism exists- hence its proximity to post-structuralism." (Cuddon, 1977, p.734). 
Though distinctions may be made in terms of their emphases on culture versus language, 
respectively, or on re-imagining empiricism versus rejecting it (Rosenau, 1992, p. 3n), 
both movements advocate deconstruction, both movements claim Foucault, Lyotard, and 
Lacan (Baldick, 1990, p. 175). Part of the apparently solid basis for these allegations of 
consonance is the postmodern rejection of the structuralist concepts of signifier and 
signified (Eagleton, 1983): as defined by Saussure, these terms suggest that meaning in 
communication is identifiable, and has direction (Cuddon, 1977, p. 735). The post-
structuralists and postmodernists appear to agree that this is rather a dynamic tension, an 
ongoing, organic and multi-voiced process in which evolving meaning may be located 
but not defined (Baudrillard, 1980). 
It is perhaps unsurprising that gender issues should emerge in a postmodern analysis 
of process research. Postmodern thought has been linked to feminist theory and gender 
theory; in an attempt to apply rational criteria and criticisms to unfamiliar situations, one 
is confronted with the notion that even 'reason' as commonly understood may be 
engendered, patriarchal, and optional (Audi, 1995, p. 634). In addition to its relation to 
or inclusion of feminist criticism, discussed later, it is argued that the rise of Marxist and 
psychoanalytic criticism are aspects of postmodemism's influence (Cuddon, 1977, p. 
734). 
The post-modem has variant and at times precise meanings in the different branches 
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of artistic, philosophical, or generally creative endeavour where it was first discussed. In 
the visual arts and architecture, it encompasses the use of multiple voices and styles, 
disconnected images, and representational forms, rather than traditional, geometric, or 
thematic forms. In literature it resists such delineation. It celebrates and reflects the 
chaos of contemporary consumer culture, and rejects the inclination to discern or impose 
pattern, theme, or meaning on the presentations of said culture- Jameson states that it is 
in fact "the cultural logic of late capitalism" (Jameson, 1984, p. 52). It derides 
interpretation as reductionist and arbitrary; an a posteriori, ideologically grounded set of 
inferences about meaning. In place of this, it substitutes a collection or succession of 
disparate contemporary or nostalgic images or styles, to be regarded with a species of 
facile, amused detachment. 
That anti-epistemological stance becomes critical to an understanding of counselling 
process. We do not, it appears to suggest, know the subject/client in any abstract way; 
we merely collaborate with them towards consensus on the meaning and significance of a 
communication (Frosh, 1995). 
In my own reading it has appeared that insofar as post-modernism is philosophical 
and abstract, it might have little application in shaping many areas of traditional 
therapeutic research - i.e. the efficacy of various models or interventions on various 
populations, or efforts to better characterize the presentation of given treatment concerns. 
Conversely, I am persuaded that it has enormous potential in process research and in 
actual practice, as it adjures us to interact with each client where they are at, in terms of 
their uniqueness. 
It is not the world or its properties but the vocabularies by which we name them that 
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are socially constructed - fashioned by human beings - which is why our understanding of 
those properties is continually changing. (Fish, 1996). 
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2. Chapter Two: Themes 
a. Why Postmodernism? 
There appears to have been some manner of recent imperative that postmodernism 
should be a subject for consideration by each field that does not wish to be dismissed as 
anachronistic or obsolete. Its apparent comfort with popular culture may be a cornerstone 
of this. The images and references that hold currency are confusing and disconnected, 
and they are presented, permutated, and discarded at bewildering speed. Consequently 
we may feel that, if we cannot encompass them in scholarship (whether our field has a 
social grounding or mandate, or not), it is an admission of perplexity - the prelude to a 
senile decline in which our dusty subject moseys along behind the world at a remove that 
comes to be measured in generations. 
Some of the reasons for this imperative may be self-evident. Postmodernists 
reference and celebrate popular culture, which seems to suggest not only that they 
understand it, but also that they discern some depth or value in it we have been wont to 
overlook. Implicitly, if we employ the postmodernist as a sort of native guide, we will be 
able to speak about the world of the moment. 
Conversely, the postmodern stance is not merely a lens which may clarify present 
culture; it is the lens through which that culture may perceive and characterize us. 
Postmodem criticism represents in part an analysis of entrenched power structures and of 
the modes of knowing which support them. When this critical tool is turned on us, one 
might say that the world is analyzing psychology as psychology has analyzed the world. 
We may perhaps be pardoned if we wish to vindicate ourselves in the face of this 
criticism. In such encounters with postmodernism or any other school of deconstruction, 
there is an implied threat that we must utilize it or shatter it, and that if we fail to do 
either, we will neither be able to claim understanding of the present world, nor relevance 
to it. We may try to represent our discipline as validated by its criteria, or we may try to 
represent its criteria as refuted by our discipline. 
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One may accept from the body of literature (Eco, 1986; Featherstone, 1988a; 
Habermas, 1989; Jameson, 1983; Jameson, 1984; Kellner, 1988; Kellner, 1989; Lyotard, 
1984; Poster, 1988) that the postmodem has asserted its existence, its importance, in such 
a manner that each discipline of scholarship acknowledges a call to weigh its claims, 
whether to integrate, refute, or merely attempt better to characterize them. There are a 
number of considerations that arise from these cautious but often-passionate encounters. 
The first debate the postmodem appears to invite is the conundrum of how it may be 
characterized in relation to each discipline. It may be relevant to the subject matter of a 
discipline, as in literature, or to the structure or practice of the discipline itself, as in 
Sociology (Bauman, 1988; Featherstone, 1988b; Lash, 1990; Rosenau, 1992). Its 
relevance may be simply open to question. It appears most commonly to be regarded as 
primarily an alternative way for a discipline to view or characterize itself, with the 
implication that this may in some fashion presage a renewal (Jameson, 1984; Rosenau, 
1992). 
Hard on the heels of this is whether something that may be best understood 
negatively, i.e. in terms of what it is not, can promise any real contribution of depth, 
growth, or direction to a discipline. As will be discussed in slightly more depth, authors 
and critics are in far from perfect agreement as to what postmodemism is (Rosenau, 
1992). This is at least in part due to its having emerged and evolved in widely different 
fields, each of which may have reacted against modernism in unique ways (Audi, 1995; 
Jameson, 1983). Another factor is that it is a theoretical stance predicated on 
deconstruction, and on an acceptance of subjective and multiple interpretations and 
therefore cannot support the notion of definition (Derrida 1981; Dews 1987). In this 
sense, it is better described as a process or a tool rather than as a school of thought 
(Kamug, 1991). That being the case, it is inevitable to question whether it can direct 
study and practice in a field, or whether it will only be able to attack, fragment, or 
undermine it (Rosenau, 1992). 
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Related to these questions of definition is one which is perhaps more exactly a matter 
of delineation: disciplines appear to debate not only the internal merits and perils of the 
postmodem stance, but the extent to which they deserve to be accorded an independent 
existence. In other words, to use psychology as a case in point, is postmodernism 
something which has arrived long after the themes, theories and practices of psychology 
have become established, even rigid, paradigms (Frosh, 1995; Brennan, 1995)? Or is it a 
pre-existing truth, an ancient theme usurped and neglected by rationalism, yet ultimately 
needed to give birth to larger dialogues as the old ones decay and crumble? 
The argument might proceed something like this: rationalism and empirical method 
are paradigms which do not perfectly explain all the phenomena in our experience. We 
accept that paradigms are constructed, and depend on consensus, and further that they 
may become rigid and resistant to valid challenges. This would be a flaw, as the 
rationalist paradigm might be incomplete, yet unwilling to evolve to counter its 
limitations (Kuhn, 1962). Now, positing all of this, we recognize that the rationalist 
paradigm is temporary entrenched, or located in time. Other paradigms existed before it. 
Other paradigms may come into existence after it. And that may in fact be happening 
now. 
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The postmodern view claims to differ from rationalist, definition-seeking perspectives 
on the world. Where, then, is the postmodern view located in time? Accepting for the 
sake of this argument that rationalism has hit a wall, one response may be to return to 
earlier paradigms which rationalism supplanted and rejected, and investigate whether 
they can facilitate a more successful exploration of our experience. This equates the 
postmodem with the primitive, the pre-rational (Lyotard, 1984). The alternative 
response is to infer that the postmodern view is located after rationalism, and is entirely 
and necessarily a product of a multifaceted, media-saturated, rapidly evolving, noisy, 
messy, multicultural world (Baudrillard, 1980; Jameson, 1984). 
Finally, can the postmodern body of criticism claim with any legitimacy to exist 
outside of common practice? For example, in many fields, a common observed response 
has been to equate aspects of the postmodern with current, recent or ancient practices, 
and to therefore reply in some sense, 'Our discipline does not require the surgery (radical, 
emergency, or merely cosmetic) which the postmodern movements seem to promulgate; 
we have been engaged in similar practices for some time,' (Brennan, 1995; Frosh, 1995; 
Murphy, 1989). 
Let us take the example of Physics. Postmodern criticism might say that physical 
data are filtered through the senses, and interpreted in a manner which is deeply 
contingent on the attitudes, assumptions, and culture of the observer; observations are 
therefore subjective and suspect (Baudrillard, 1980; Jameson, 1984; Kamug, 1991; 
Rosenau, 1992). The difficulty is that Physics itself made and accepted this point (vide 
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Heisenberg) several decades before the earliest appearance of identified Postmodem 
thought (Lightman, 2000). A Physicist might then say with some weight that postmodem 
criticism, far from undermining accepted theories in Physics, is simply a product of them. 
This presents a conundrum, as the postmodemist in tum might counter that physicists 
behave and talk as though uncertainty is a specific phenomenon within Science, whereas 
a more rigorous application of its implications might call into question the entire field 
(Brennan, 1995). 
At last arises the problem of what to do with the creature. Of those who have 
commented on the postmodem from within the therapeutic disciplines (Hanes, 1996; 
Roffey, 1993; Safran & Messer, 1997), some have determined to rise to a perceived 
demand to discard aspects of the discipline to participate in a new dialogue (Brennan, 
1995; Murphy, 1989), while others have maintained that the postmodem is ultimately 
nihilistic at best, nebulous at worst (Frosh, 1995). 
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b. Rejection of Dualism 
One of the most central characterizations of postmodern criticism is that it opposes 
those overarching, abstract schema which have been constructed (or possibly, let us say, 
revealed or inferred) to codify and explain some significant arena of experience Lyotard, 
1984; Rosenau, 1992). These would include, but not be limited to, such dominant 
monoliths as metaphysics, science, and religion. Both those great systems themselves, 
and the aspects of thinking that desire to create and explore them, are rejected as 
mechanisms of control (Lash, 1990). It is argued that these systems are imposed on 
experience rather than derived from it. They dictate reality rather than describing it, and 
impose the illusion of consensus when in fact our experience may be as aptly understood 
through diversity (Jameson 1984; Lyotard 1984). These great paradigms, so vastly 
conceived and so minutely detailed, are not ultimately comprehensive (Baudrillard, 
1980). Consequently their claim to reflect and explain our experience of reality is 
rejected (Kamug, 1991). 
Postmodemists denote these systems for describing and defining our experiences as 
metanarratives (Lyotard 1984; Poster 1988), literally 'after-stories', great stories about 
the world which rest on a supposition of dualism (Murphy, p.61). The Philosophical 
Dictionary (http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/index.htm) defines dualism as "the 
belief that mental things and physical things are fundamentally different kinds of 
entities". Dualism reflects a strength in the western scientific tradition, an intuition of 
cause and effect which has fueled us in interpreting our environment, manipulating it, and 
improving on it through invention (Brennan, 1995). This is at the root of the dominance 
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of our species, and more narrowly of its western culture; it is perhaps grimly unsurprising 
that there is a certain territorial pride over the rewards of this world-view. 
This pride remained largely vigorous and secure, Brennan (1995) argues, until a 
predominantly German-driven philosophical tradition led to a series of predominantly 
German-driven wars. The Great Western Analytic Tradition, from Kant to Wittgenstein 
was culminated and immolated in two World Wars. Distressingly, these were the natural 
fruit of it, marvels of scientific advancement and cultural hegemony. "Philosophers 
reacted both to the failure of their tradition to safeguard civilization and truth, and to the 
complicity of science and philosophy in the horrors of both wars." (p. 100). 
The theme of dualism has appeared in some form in western thought since Plato's 
conception of the Realm of Ideas, separate from this transient material world. The Realm 
of Ideas provided a kind of unity for intellectual experience, as abstract concepts, seen to 
resemble each other in kind, required a common basis. Murphy (1989) expresses the case 
with greater wariness: "Western philosophy has been haunted by the promise of apodictic 
knowledge. Some sort of absolute foundation has been sought traditionally to give 
meaning to everyday events." (p. 61). 
This thirst for apodictic knowledge, the author elaborates, is in conflict with the tenet 
that we, as creatures confines by our senses and bound by our flawed material forms, 
cannot transcend our individual biases of perception. Supposing it to be the case that 
pure and objective truths exist, can we somehow set aside limitation and bias to 
apprehend them clearly? How can subjective beings have unsullied access to objective 
truths, or even have access to a certain knowledge of their existence? This in itself is a 
core argument of the postmodernists (Murphy, 1989). 
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The rationalist response is that an impartial medium or tool could bridge the gap. 
Here enters the role of theology, metaphysics, and ultimately science. Again for 
argument's sake let us be specific, take the example of psychology. Psychological 
experiment or the therapeutic distance practiced in a counselling session, the critics might 
parry, are simply ways of gathering, organizing, and presenting data. They are 
constrained by our subjectivity as practitioners (Safran & Messer, 1997). We gather data 
we have already arbitrarily declared to be relevant. We organize incidents it in terms of a 
determined pattern, which may not have reference to how we find them. And finally we 
exercise rhetoric, and the social weight of our expert voice, to coerce acceptance of our 
arguments as reflecting a greater, objective, reality. 
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c. Language Games: Author, Reader, and Text 
Through each of these stages, our engagement with our participants or clients is 
permeated with the medium of thought and communication: language. The postmodem 
emphasis on the role of language appears to have been developed to subtle and arcane 
extremes, often employing the creation of new words, or the unorthodox application of 
existing terms, heightening a sense of mystery and distance from the familiar. 
Ultimately, their arguments appear to be grounded in a pre-Socratic conception of 
language, where the term and its referent are not distinguished. In Socratic thought 
words are treated as referring to the abstract concept, which exists as it were 'behind' the 
thing denoted. But the Sophists appear to have regarded wordplay as a trade rather than a 
calling, and appear to have made no distinction between persuasive rhetoric and 
manipulation of actual objects or phenomena (Kitto, 1991). This introduces a point that 
may initially appear subtle: reality, knowledge, and truth are not objective or absolute 
(Lyotard, 1984; Kamug, 1991). They exist only as products of language; one explores a 
specific phenomenon, grounded in one's own context, characterized through one's own 
exercise of rhetoric. This is not 'mere' subjectivity, but the equal of all other 'truths', as 
no clearer or higher path actually exists (Rosenau, 1992). 
In literary criticism - the milieu in which much of the language of postmodemism is 
grounded - the debate which dominated the 20th century concerned whether meaning was 
located with the Author, the Reader, or the Text (Eagleton, 1983). 
If meaning is located with the Author, the argument goes, it is possible to get a poem 
'wrong' - the Author knows what it means, and why it was written, and may correct the 
critic. This school of thought gave rise to the practice of examining an Author's life and 
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times in minute biographical detail, the better to make inferences regarding the context of 
her or his intent. This, it was reasoned, would allow the critic to approximate the 'true' 
meaning if the Author's work. Among the difficulties this presents are the notions that 
multiple interpretations of a work cannot be valid, that a work cannot have deeper or 
more complex meanings than the author intends at its creation, and that the intent of a 
deceased or merely uncommunicative author must always be in doubt. 
If meaning was located with the Reader, on the other hand, meaning is located with 
each subject, and is uncovered through his or her interaction with the text. In such a case 
meaning and truth become synonymous with interpretation. This is an uncomfortable 
position for the scholar. It presents the problem that a Reader could ignore an Author's 
own notes, or contradict the Author's interpretation of her or his own work. Perhaps 
even more significant, all interpretations with some reasonably defensible basis might be 
equally valid. A multiplicity of interpretations might exist, none usurping or refuting the 
other. 
The notion of meaning located exclusively in the text was problematic. Textual 
criticism has been a practice of narrow analysis of content, and is often concerned with 
the book as a physical object and the search for the most original or authoritative version 
of a Text. 
Borrowing presumably in spite of themselves from the practice of Hegel, the 
postmodemists attempt to move from thesis and antithesis to synthesis, maintaining that 
all rather than none of the foregoing are true. 
In his most famous essay, Is there a text in this class? (1980), the anti-foundationalist 
Stanley Fish elucidates this argument and its implications. He describes a student 
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approaching him asking whether there is a text in his class; Fish replied in the affirmative 
and referred the student to the syllabus and the bookstore. The student clarified that 
having just taken a course in critical theory, they were trying to anticipate Fish's views on 
whether meaning resides with the author. Fish relates laughingly replying in the 
negative, as it had been possible for him to misunderstand the student's question-
therefore the meaning of words can be unstable between author and reader. In other 
words, Yes, there is a text in the sense that he has provided a syllabus. And conversely, 
No, Text cannot exist as an abstract artifact or locus of meaning, since variant 
interpretations are possible in language. And yet finally, Yes, there is a Text, in the sense 
that each set of interactions between Reader and Author represents a genuine engagement 
in which meaning may be located within language and situated in place, person, and time 
(Fish, 1980). 
"Postmodemists," Murphy (1989) states, "are fond of comparing the social world to a 
text." (p.63). By consensus between an Author and various Readers, the text is admitted 
to exist. The question of its truth or meaning is then a matter for interaction. It may 
begin as what is understood by the Author, but each Reader engages in a separate 
interaction with the Author. In consequence, there is a succession of interpretations, but 
each one if rigorous will be an engagement by the reader in the author's world, not a 
unilateral imposition of meaning. Of these interpretations, none can be definitive or 
enduring -these are not real qualities of 'facts' or 'observations'. 
To return to the example of counselling, the client may make statements or displays 
behaviours. These have a meaning for the client at the time, but they also have an 
independent existence, as demonstrated by the fact that the counsellor sees them, and 
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may interpret them independently of the client's awareness or intent. Through this 
engagement by the counsellor, the language creations (verbal or not) of the client may be 
interpreted. These interpretations are mutable; different counsellors may engage and 
interpret differently. This may even be true of the same counsellor at different times, or 
when applying different theoretical models (Safran & Messer, 1997). 
This is not to suggest, Murphy (1989) argues, that interpretation is to be discredited or 
eschewed (p.65). It is the prescriptive and pathologizing process of diagnosis that is 
suspect. 
One basis of the counsellor's role may be to identify and mediate dissonance between 
the client and the perceived norms or rules of society; the client may be in a state of 
external conflict with these norms, or may be at odds with them internally insofar as they 
do not support other of the client's needs. This conceptualization of counselling draws 
upon the textual themes discussed earlier. Social norms are obviously socially 
constructed; they are perhaps less obviously linguistic artifacts, the imposition of which 
is a kind of social control or power game (Jameson, 1983). When individuals diverge 
from these norms, a state of conflict becomes apparent between two languages: that of 
reality as rhetorical construct or social consensus, and that of the divergent individual 
(Murphy, 1989). 
A prevalent theme in postmodem thought is that language is the basis not only of 
thought and interaction, but of perception and interpretation. It is frequently asserted that 
reality is socially constructed, and that social constructs and interaction are grounded in 
language games (Poster, 1988). The world itself, as well as each of the objects and 
phenomena in it, is described as a text. It is perhaps worth exploring the basis of this 
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assertion briefly, as so much of postmodern argument rests upon it. Let us postulate that 
our naive observations are filtered, interpreted, and delineated through cognition, and 
further that this cognition is largely a process of manipulating symbols or icons which 
represent objects, events, or concepts (Kamug, 1991 ). At this point interpretation 
supercedes observation; meaning is imposed once the observer decides how to 
characterize the observed. This does not suppose that we think only through the medium 
of language, but rather that we cannot describe or interpret without employing it. It is 
worth observing that the Greek word Logos means both "word" and "reason". In pre-
Socratic thought it denoted the unifying order of existence, while to the Sophists 
mentioned earlier it was identified with debates and their topics (Pickett, 2000). These 
usages appear to prefigure the arguments of postmodern criticism, and may provide some 
foundation for an argument that it does not derive from peculiarly contemporary themes; 
one may speculate that it is a current recapitulation of some of western thoughts earliest 
insights. 
Taken to its extreme, the equation of postmodemism with language games may tend 
to break down; it has been credited with implying that language is an inadequate medium 
for reflecting experience (Frosh, 1995). Its adherents appear to counter that it is rather 
the only adequate medium, and that its detractors are attempting to imply that some 
higher codifying system exists- in effect, some metanarrative. 
Linked to this is the assertion that postmodernism rejects causality. This argument is 
of course in no way peculiar to it; David Hume ( 1999) made this the cornerstone of his 
empirical philosophy in the mid-18th century. The postmodem contribution appears 
rather to be in its rendering of the search for causality as a circular exercise. 
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Interpretation is argued to work within the rules of a field so exclusively that its product 
is simply a kind of renaming, a rhetorical artifact. 
"Baudrillard' s argument has been seminal for postmodemist theorists of this 
persuasion. He claims that interpretation is by nature mistaken, that 'getting beyond 
appearances' is an impossible task, because every approach that attempts to do this -
including psychoanalytic and other depth-psychological approaches- becomes 
seduced by its own terms, forms and appearances, until it becomes a kind of play on 
words, a set of investigations devoted not to uncovering 'truth', but to persuading, 
deceiving or flattering others." (Frosh, 1995, p. 181). 
This can be disturbing stuff. Surely, some have argued, if we reject causality and 
interpretation, everything becomes similarly meaningless. Postmodemists are known to 
counter that everything rather becomes similarly laden with meaning, but this would 
appear to amount to the same thing. The flaw here is the supposition that the 
postmodernist pretends to objectivity or impartiality. One is not expected to treat one's 
own perceptions and stories as merely arbitrary, or the equal of all others; naturally one's 
own stories are those most prized. The catch is simply proceeding in the acceptance that 
others will feel the same about their separate worlds (Fish, 2002). 
It is not, in other words, that all stories are equal - better and more useful stories can 
be composed or collaborated on. It is rather that one may surrender the belief that they 
are required to be, or can be, true (Kamug, 1991). 
This notion of better or more useful stories raises spectres of its own - how are they 
chosen? How are they evaluated? What quality in them, or faculty of the observing 
subject, can determine which are better? We are not permitted recourse to apodictic 
knowledge; this would be seeking shelter in essentialism. Again, the answer appears to 
be that we accept that these better or more useful stories are only relatively so, rather than 
absolutely so. They are deemed superior by the particular engaged subjects, at a given 
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time, in a specific place. It does not necessarily therefore follow that other subjects, in 
other times and places, will not concur. 
"Postmodernism is not, in this reading of things, a licence for superficiality, nor is it 
an invitation towards endless 'restorying'; it is rather an argument that all the words 
in the world can serve only to keep us apart, misperceiving each other in our 
narratives and storylines. Consequently, it is words, which are, literally, superficial." 
(Frosh, 1995, p. 188). 
There is a certain problematic tendency to characterize modernism as everything that 
the world and we currently are, and postmodernism as a destination, an ideological 
rebellion against the modem. This gives rise to a litany of complaints, in which each 
element of postmodem criticism is asserted to be also in some sense a feature of 
modernist trends or phenomena. But postmodemism, rather than being a kind of formal 
antithesis to modernism, by which the former may be delineated and diminished, may 
simply be a means of describing what is problematic about modernity. 
The art of the counsellor might be divided for the purposes of explanation into 
diagnosis and treatment. Diagnosis, it might be argued, can stand alone in the field of 
assessment, but in the larger work of counselling, treatment may be accepted as the goal 
of diagnosis. On the other hand, treatment, it must be stipulated, cannot usefully exist 
without some form of diagnosis, both to direct it or define its goals so therapy may begin, 
and to determine when those goals have been satisfactorily addressed so therapy may 
end. The role of diagnosis as an exercise in definition, however, would be rejected by the 
postmodem practitioner. It supposes that there can be an abstract metanarrative which 
defines norms such as health, and further that deviations from such norms would express 
themselves as one of a number of discrete categories. In an altemati ve formulation, the 
therapist's encounter with the client's behaviour is intended as an exploratory effort, a 
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mutual encounter to express the linguistic logic underlying the client's perceptions and 
actions. Because of this formulation, it is unsurprising that the narrative model of therapy 
has been among the most active in embracing postmodern thought. 
In the narrative formulation of the counsellor's role, the counsellor does not have 
answers, but applies skills to assist the client in exploring alternative stories, and in 
reformulating their story in a way that is more satisfactory to both. 
The client's reality as they present it, the rationale of their language, is to be regarded 
in context, and engaged respectfully. The postmodern practitioner would for example 
consider whether the client's plight might in fact be the product of political or economic 
factors (Murphy, 1989), or of censure or violence from any of a number of social 
institutions. 
Practitioners are exhorted to surrender their role in social control, and instead to 
respect the client's identity, be flexible in the face of their resistance. The rules of 
interaction, and of describing behaviour, motive, or dysfunction, should be modelled on 
those used socially- counselling is understood simply as a skilled form of social 
interaction. 
"First, structural metaphors are inappropriate for describing social life. Norms are not 
outlined by roles, institutions, or other so-called natural phenomena. Second, 
deviance is not irrational, simply because the bounds of rationality that are typically 
recognized are transgressed. Even ostensibly bizarre behaviour is sustained by a 
linguistic world that has meaning. And third, intervention must not be directed at 
social systems, with the aim of reintegrating clients into society. Because reality is 
sustained linguistically, the realism suggested by the image of a system cannot be 
justified. Instead, intervention should be directed toward the world of experience that 
is created through language." (Murphy, 1989, pp. 65-66). 
Some theorists appear to fear the implications of postmodernism for therapy, or at 
least to doubt its utility. It is accused of revelling in unreason, of merely deconstructing 
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and scrutinizing the limits of linguistic interaction (Frosh, 1995). Such a stance appears 
to align exclusively with so-called negative postmodernism, equating the postmodem 
with analysis explored to a nihilistic extreme- a charge often levied against Baudrillard 
(Eagleton, 1983). While a rigorous application, this is not the universal stance (Rosenau, 
1992). The inclination to portray postmodem thought exclusively in this light appears to 
reflect a sense of foreboding, a belief that postmodernism has an objective of 
undermining counselling practice. This appears to be a rather exclusive and rationalist 
line of attack. Such predictions may be seen as a concomitant hazard of understanding 
postmodem thought through imitation rather than application. They are obviated if rather 
than attempting to emulate what postmodernism is, one elects to avoid what it is not. 
Attempts to apply its tenets will tend toward excess, and will tend to treat it as another 
species of rationalist metanarrative. But it does not appear to be a prescription for the 
destruction of fields of study or of social order. It is rather a gadfly to fields of study or 
institutions of social control which pretend to an impartial objectivity or an inherent 
ascendance. Though some adherents would naturally disagree, it is inherently a mode of 
thought that celebrates diversity. Choosing to represent postmodern thought in its most 
exclusive and negative formulation does not appear likely to be a valuable or informative 
line of inquiry, as its only contribution to other fields would be their censure or 
destruction. While it is not suggested that this branch of postmodem scholarship lacks 
weight, focussing on it appears to be a means by which authors such as Frosh (1995) seek 
to dismiss postmodem thought, equating the fringe with the whole. 
Brennan (1995) links this to the dichotomy between theory and practice in 
psychology. Practitioners are believed to make limited or at least unsystematic and 
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eclectic use of theory, she argues, while theoreticians become distanced over time not 
merely from the reality of practice, but from all theories save those most resembling their 
own (p. 99). An expert, an old saying goes, is someone who knows more and more about 
less and less until he knows everything about nothing. This stereotype of the pedantic 
theorist appears to be a strong metaphor for what happens to the counsellor who, filled 
with the rush of love for psychology and science, and faith in rationalism and insight, 
stumbles into an encounter with a real person - a client. 
The rarefied air of deconstructionist debate would appear to be both heady and 
comfortable for the theoretician, but an interesting consideration is raised. The 
theoretician may want postmodemism to be complete, to be cohesive, to have answers. 
The practitioner, by contrast, may be supposed to like its apparent permissiveness and 
flexibility. Conceptualized in these ways, it becomes a veil for their conflict, as apparent 
in the literature. 
Notwithstanding the consonance between postmodem and pre-Socratic or Sophist 
thought, an argument can be made that contemporary attempts to apply postmodem 
thought to counselling are expressions of current academic fashion. The contributions of 
postmodern analysis, in terms of deconstruction and regard for multiple voices, can be 
found within the traditional practice of therapy (Frosh, 1995; Brennan, 1995). 
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d. The Other in Counselling 
An acceptance of alternative voices and a respect for otherness can be located as well 
within traditional models and conceptions of counselling. The counselling relationship 
can be experienced as a kind of relativistic encounter, in which judgement is held in 
abeyance in favour of deeper consideration. 
Freud is credited with recognizing the tension between juxtaposition of the 
fundamentally and enduringly alien nature of the other with the desire to characterize it, 
explore it, map it, and claim it in the name of sanity. This 'other', experienced first as the 
client and later as the client's unconscious processes, is regarded as ultimately 
indefinable (Frosh, 1995). 
While this describes a receptivity to difference, it appears dubious that this may 
equate to the tolerance of multiple voices, or the rejection of metanarratives. Many other 
fields posit areas of inquiry which are alleged to be beyond human comprehension, or at 
the very least beyond our present abilities. Astronomy and particle physics have 
described their perennially frustrated search for a general unifying field theory, their 
exploration of chaos theory, and their endorsement of the uncertainty principle (Brennan, 
1995). Theorists in artificial intelligence have questioned whether human minds can 
describe their own properties. Yet these fields ultimately adhere to metanarratives. 
Acceptance of ignorance, or complexity, or chaos remains ineluctably modernist as long 
as what is invoked is a single voice. Freud's caution and his acceptance of ambiguity 
were laudable, but they do not hold out the possibility that some people or cultures do not 
have an unconscious or its components, or that they have an alternate story of their 
psyche. 
27 
A difficulty arises when we say that because counselling is at times receptive of 
heterogeneity, it is as a whole defensible in the face of the postmodem incursion. 
Similarly, the negative extreme of deconstruction may be highlighted to argue the 
impracticability of the process itself. Both appear to treat therapy and postmodernism as 
discrete, proprietary terms, with the object of protecting counselling from close 
examination. Postmodernism is in the final analysis a school of interpretation. Attempts 
to shield counselling from its scrutiny end by making its point, that metanarratives cannot 
tolerate or include alternative voices. 
The scientific metanarrati ve which permeates counselling theory and practise puts 
forth the notion of therapeutic distance. On the one hand, this is a practice intended to 
respect the difference of both practitioner and client, recognizing that their stories remain 
distinct, and that their senses of selfhood should not bleed each into other, or give way to 
imposition by the other. On the other hand, this sense of distance can be problematic 
when what is really meant is height- distance in a hierarchical power structure. That 
objectivity which is asserted to rely on distance is grounded in the notion that one party is 
impartial, and the other is not; consequently the former may judge, and the latter must 
acquiesce. That this is a necessary component of rationalism as embodied in science is 
far from clear. The arch-rationalist Spinoza characterized learning as a process of placing 
one's self within the unfamiliar to experience it from within, stating that learning was a 
process of incorporating new understandings so that they cease to be strange and 
fearsome (1989). 
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PART TWO: THE PRACTICUM 
3. Chapter Three: Overview of Practicum Issues 
There has been in very recent years an increase in interest in postmodern thought as it 
infonns psychological research. With this corresponding attention has been given to the 
ways in which mainstream psychology is now seen to have failed to respond to the 
demands of ethics and social change. The dominant approach to ethical concerns has 
been to protect the practitioner by generating guidelines for behaviour. This has promoted 
a kind of literalism, such that practitioners are ill equipped to respond in an integrated and 
'present' way to ethical dilemmas. Certifying bodies have typically derived ethical codes 
through surveys of the opinions of their members. These codes then come to have a 
prescriptive power, delineating which actions will result in censure or loss of 
certification. 
While professional ethics have come to attract greater attention in the literature, this 
has not been paralleled by equal changes in counsellor education and training. Beginning 
counsellors receive little exposure to critical approaches to ethics and practice. The 
prevailing trend has been to inform them of the relevant codes, but not to train or prepare 
them for the lived reality of an ethical dilemma. 
With the recent growth of attention to reflective practice and the counsellor's 
experience of counselling, the failure to develop and promote critical views of ethical 
practice can be perceived as a failure to allow authority and voice to the practitioner's 
direct experience of the special challenges of practice. 
Of particular interest for the scope of this paper is the special range of issues and 
ethical concerns which face male counsellors. Male counsellors are not in the mainstream 
of the profession, either in practice or in graduate programs. They tend still to be over-
represented in publication and power, perhaps a result of traditional male role pressures 
to eschew the emotional demands of practice in favour of research, and the gender role 
mandate to professional 'ambition'. It is in no way my intent to imply that men have 
become marginalized in the profession. There may be gender role resistance to critical 
ethics and reflective practice, or simply under-representation in training. Whatever the 
agent, there are some practitioner concerns that are more particularly experienced by 
male counsellors, concerns which the literature has utterly failed to address, and which 
training has therefore overlooked. 
Many ethical issues are not covered by current counsellor education practices. 
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Mainstream practice itself is challenged by postmodern criticism to be open to a 
multiplicity of voices, of authorities. The gendered voice of the counsellor is likely to be 
marginalized, and inasmuch as ethical concerns are inadequately addressed this is 
particularly true of some issues experienced by the reflective practitioner. The 
intersection of the development of gender identity, postmodern ethics, and professional 
practice remain unexplored. Research in this area would both promote improved practice 
and facilitate more inclusive counsellor education (McGowen & Hart, 1990). 
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4. Chapter Four: Case History 
a. Theoretical Background 
During my Master's internship, I provided personal counselling to students of various 
ages at a small community college. My reflections in this paper are based on experience 
from this internship. During the course of my client work, I had set for myself an explicit 
mandate to examine carefully my biases. This included trying to understand the ways in 
which my training experience in particular and the conventions of counselling in general 
were shaping my perceptions and intentions within the counselling process. 
Insofar as I had a means or tool toward this end it was an inclination for 
deconstruction which had emerged from readings in Habermas' Critical Theory as it 
related to literature. Insofar as I had an epistemological or hermeneutic stance it was an 
interest in phenomenology, which had emerged from exposure to Heidegger's and 
Husserl's descripitions of the nature of time and perception. This was widely divorced 
from the theories and practices I had been opposed to in my studies. It created, however, 
a kind of interior eye or reading for the more logocentric and mechanistic cognitive voice 
of my education, my experience of myself in the role of counsellor. 
My academic and practicum supervision history at that point had included supervisors 
from three separate and relatively conventional therapeutic models; none of the three 
emphasized their eclecticism. Their interests, respectively, were the client-centered, 
cognitive-behavioural, and psychodynamic models, and so it was these I had been 
encouraged to familiarize myself with, and work within. The theoretical grounding 
informing this inquiry is drawn from recent discussions of the roles of postmodern 
thought in counselling. 
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Early in the internship I was confronted with the ethical, emotional, and therapeutic 
dilemma of a client who expressed social and romantic interest in me, naturally to the 
exclusion of the therapeutic process. Impacting on the ethical mandate to terminate 
therapy was the client's explicit request upon beginning with me that she not be referred 
elsewhere; she did not want to have to share her story too many times, even with me. I 
was tom between terminating therapy and 'working with' what I initially considered to 
be simple transference on her part. I came to feel more and more betrayed; I felt my 
training and the theoretical models I had been directed towards had failed to adequately 
prepare me for the emotional reality of the ethical dilemma. Ethics codes tend to espouse 
divergent but predominantly clear responses to the situation; the actual behaviour of 
professionals is a less clear and consistent guide. There is in traditional therapy, 
particularly in the dominant 'medical model', a certain myth of counsellor infallibility 
and invulnerability, which serves to mask a variety of abuses and indiscretions. As new 
theories and postmodem critiques emerge, the internal inconsistencies of the profession 
and practice of counselling are highlighted. Several aspects of the situation I found 
myself in became interesting to me from a 'theory of practice' standpoint. 
In the first place, I was concerned that resources did not appear to be available to deal 
with the personal and emotional impact of the dilemma. I was discouraged from 
discussing or exploring the issue. My placement supervisor, another supervisor, and my 
peers declined to share insights or personal experiences, and seemed actively 
uncomfortable. In particular, I received cues that as a man it was both inappropriate for 
me to be in this situation, and inappropriate to discuss it. I have found nothing in the 
literature, then or since, that discusses the issue even peripherally; there is certainly 
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research on ethical codes and violations, and there is literature on the counselling process, 
but no discussion of the personal experience of problematic situations. 
In the second place, I was conscious that the theories I had been taught or encouraged 
to use failed to address the reality of the situation. They are not associated with a body of 
process research. Psychodynamic theory and cognitive behavioural theory do not 
integrate the experience of the professional or the ethics of the profession in their 
conception of practice. Client-centered theory regards the emotional and ethical stance of 
the counsellor as inextricable from and essential to therapy, but as in psychodynamic 
theory the counsellor is described as either a simple mirror for the client or as a figure of 
great moral and emotional resilience. In other words, ethical and emotional dilemmas do 
not arise, as the counsellor is either so focussed on the client's issues or so well adjusted 
that there is no need for the professional to find support in the literature or from peers. 
Cognitive-behavioural theory is far more emotionally barren; in its delineation of the 
techniques for 'educating and retraining' clients, it seems not merely prescriptive but in 
fact faintly impatient. I felt caught between irreconcilable traditions. 
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b. The Client 
The client, whom I will call N., was a single mother in her 30's with two young 
children. She presented issues surrounding past and present relationships with men. N. 
had recently experienced her second divorce, and expressed some confusion surrounding 
her ex-husband's continued emotional stake in her behaviour. Her 'ex' was a solitary and 
unexpressive individual who had initiated separation because of a stated wish for solitude 
and a discomfort with the emotional demands of the relationship. He preserved regular 
contact with her; N. felt that he didn't want her to become socially active, and was afraid 
of her meeting someone new. 
Her meager external resources included her brother, a wealthy and famous musician. 
He had offered to 'be there for her' but was rarely free from work demands. N. stated that 
she felt that his emotional restraint and rather advantaged lifestyle made it hard to 
identify her concerns with his. She described her parents' marriage as poor, preserved for 
the sake of the children, but permeated by constant fighting. She described her family as 
insensitive and unexpressive emotionally. Conversely she felt denied a voice because 
they described her as too sensitive, too needing of overt validation and physical affection, 
"cuddles and so on". She described herself as needing to talk a lot about her problems. 
To some extent she internalized the familial perception of this as vulnerability and a lack 
of efficacy. 
Her father emerged as the figure most evocative of affect, though she professed not to 
have thought about him in years. She recalled an event from her early teens, when her 
father refused to give her a ride home - 5 miles on the lonely road her friend had died on 
one week earlier. When she was first married, her father had asked her for input on a 
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disagreement, which flattered her, but he was then enraged when she agreed with her 
mother. He struck her; she struck back and became angry, saying, "How dare you! I'm 
not a child!" He had died unexpectedly over a decade ago, in his late 40s. She stated she• 
had a lot of 'unresolved issues' with him because of their bad relationship, which had 
improved toward the end. She felt there were a lot of things she'd like to say to him and 
ask him. 
N. said she thought that she needed affirmation and praise, and that praise was more 
valuable coming from a man- her girlfriends may give it, but she needs to hear it from a 
man. She could not describe any male relationships whkh were both positive and 
platonic; she said she found men confusing. At this point, the presenting issues seemed to 
me to be assertiveness, grief, and low self-concept. 
At the end of the initial session she expressed feelings of attraction toward me, as 
well as concern about how that would affect the viability of counselling. I explained that 
given what she had described about her male relationships, I felt that her feelings were 
probably no more than a certain natural transference. I suggested that it would be 
important to distinguish between the feelings and intensity associated with the 
counselling relationship and other feelings she identified regarding my appearance, 
attributed traits, etc .. She said that she would rather be 'up front' about it, for fear of 
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developing a 'crush' or similar inappropriate or counterproductive feelings. Briefly, over 
the next two sessions she focussed more and more on these feelings, and described them 
as a barrier to her engaging in process. She suggested that we could meet in a social 
setting, first terminating therapy if need be; later she described a wish that I accompany 
her on a vacation. 
35 
Pope et al. (1987) identify the percentage of counsellors who feel it is acceptable to 
become a social friend of a former client as 59%; to accept a client's gift worth at least 
$50: 21 %; to become sexually involved with former client: 23%; to kiss a client: 16%; to 
engage in sexual fantasy about a client: 38%; to be sexually attracted to a client: 63%. 
There is apparently within the profession a grotesque prevalence of ethical standards 
which many would at least outwardly profess to find repugnant. The Rogerian 
genuineness and unconditional regard, so evocative of the Kantian injunction to treat 
others as ends in themselves rather than as means to ends of our own, is not in evidence 
in these statistics. The Psychodynamic mandate to treat any countertransference as an 
impetus to exploration of one's own unresolved developmental concerns is similarly 
missing from such a catalogue of emotional confusion and moral bankruptcy. It seemed 
to me during my internship that these were hollow standards, in practice more likely to 
obscure abuse and shield weakness than to guide behaviour and promote reflective 
practice. As such, they present especially toxic matter for the supervision experience, 
which relies particularly heavily on a reflective practice model. 
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c. Ethical Dilemma 
This experience of being confronted with an inappropriate invitation to a personal 
relationship with a client was for me a powerful and disturbing one. The client's 
expression of interest seemed to me to relate very directly to the issues she identified to 
work on in session. She had prefaced our first session with an explanation of how 
difficult she found it to discuss her concerns, and how important it was to her that she not 
be placed in the position of having to regurgitate her story again for another counsellor at 
a later time. Both issues created in me a strong sense of responsibility to sustain the 
therapeutic relationship. Both the prevailing ethical code and the wishes of the client 
were in conflict with this, pulling in opposite directions. The code in effect in the area of 
the college (i.e. in the United Kingdom) dictated no relationship ever, with any current or 
former client. The client herself expressed the feeling that the therapy could have no 
value while her feelings were in conflict with my role. Unwilling for various reasons to 
abuse my position, I reluctantly informed her after the third session that I felt obligated to 
terminate therapy, and referred her to the six week waiting list of a female counsellor at 
another institution. 
While my actions seemed mandated by the prescriptions of many ethics codes, I felt 
discomfort at what I saw as a betrayal of her need for help- a reaction I associate with an 
inappropriate gender-role perception that clients should be protected. 
Further, I felt profoundly betrayed by the limitations of my training and the cultural 
constraints of supervision. The prevailing model had made no allowances for the stress 
of the client's attentions, the dilemma of the need to force termination, or my own need 
for frank and open investigation of the event in supervision. Some things were just not 
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done or talked about, it appeared. My own attempts to deconstruct the experience and 
discern the privileged theoretical and social voices which had impacted on the situation 
multiplied my questions without providing any direction or impetus to action. Certainly I 
began to read into mainstream theory and the academic guidelines for supervision a 
project for the protection and promotion of the profession, in stark contrast to the often 
avowed mandate that the client's needs come first. The protection of the counsellor and 
the preservation of an appearance of propriety were, it appeared, of the first importance. 
The corollary, it seemed, was that the counsellor's honesty, emotional preparedness, and 
capacity for reflection on practice were at best irrelevant, at worst detrimental. 
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5. Chapter Five: Interpretations 
a. Modernist Theoretical Descriptions 
The three conventional modernist theories identified earlier fail as guides to 
behaviour or lenses for personal experience, but not as descriptive tools. These schools 
that I went to within counselling theory failed to inform me; I can explain the encounter 
in terms of those theories, but their explanations don't help to guide my behaviour or 
facilitate my interpretation of what to do. 
Psychodynamic theory is particularly suited to the description of the client's 
behaviour and my own experience. N. transferred to me her desire for male affirmation 
and approval, which had only been met (though never satisfied) in romantic relationships. 
Her rejecting father's authoritarian role created a strong message that women like her 
mother and herself were deficient except insofar as they received male support and 
approval. Her brother's overwhelming professional success sent a similar message; as a 
man, he had resources she lacked, and did not require the emotional outlets and supports 
she relied on. Her early impulses toward independence and emotional self-expression met 
with resistance from her father. Her desire for personal power and a sense of value or 
efficacy as a woman was repressed, as what most of her resentment towards her father 
and brother. The former desire was sublimated as a need to be validated as an object of 
sexual desire. The latter was sublimated as admiration for her brother and a fixation on 
the lost opportunities for approval from her father. My physical resemblance to her 
brother and his peers may have suggested that like him I could have resisted her father's 
oppression and exhibited independence, strength, and material success, a stereotype of 
masculinity or potency. She may have perceived me as a male authority figure, a man 
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forcing her to explore uncomfortable and private issues, judging her wanting for her 
emotionality as her father did, appearing impervious and private like her brother. The 
combination of her established defenses and such threat as I may have represented 
elicited immediate resistance and an unconscious desire to sabotage the therapeutic 
process. While this resistance should have been seen as a positive cue that sensitive 
emotional material was ready to emerge into consciousness, it was sabotaged in turn by 
my own resistance in the form of countertransference. Earlier unresolved relationships, 
for example, may have left residual overprotective and accommodating behaviours, or an 
excessive wariness of perceived dependence. In theory, such countertransference should 
be addressed though consultation, or through the therapist participating in therapy. My 
attempts to address this in supervision were resisted; the ethical mandate of the situation 
superceded the other needs of my client and myself. 
Developmentally, a case could be made for the evidence of oral-incorporative 
personality issues such as low self-esteem, voluntary self-isolation, and barriers to trust, 
affection, or the maintenance of intense relationships. In Erikson's psychosocial view, 
while there may be residual issues of trust versus mistrust, there are also significant 
unresolved developmental issues with regard to industry versus inferiority (personal 
adequacy and goal-setting sabotaged by her brother's competence and fame in her 
school-age years) and intimacy versus isolation. Perversely, her apparent pattern of 
moving fairly quickly from man to man in her support systems argues a lack of intimacy 
and a fear of it rather than a facility with it. Mahler's conception of the narcissistic 
character arising from inadequate resolution of separation/individuation issues echoes 
N' s frail self-concept and hunger for attention and affection; her unpopular predilection 
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for sharing in detail her feelings stopped short of actually resolving those emotional 
issues; as in her other relationships, she tended to express her needs, but terminate before 
they could be addressed and resolved. 
The techniques of client-centered humanistic theory in this circumstance seem 
potentially hazardous to the particular client and unsympathetic to the therapist. The 
client's low self-regard might be said to stem from a conflict between her basic need for 
self-expression and emotional candor, and her need for approval from others. In theory, 
the correct therapeutic stance is to be non-evaluative, non judgmental, warm and 
empathetic. This might take the form of understanding and accepting her feelings of 
attraction; the counsellor would then affirm the validity of her need to express such 
affection. The message should perhaps be, "I accept these feeling of attraction; they are 
not bad or wrong. I understand and value you as a person, therefore you can explore 
emotional issues like these without threatening the process." This natural exploration 
would then lead to an acceptance on her part of both the emotion of attraction and the 
need for approval; the facilitative environment would promote self-esteem and growth. 
The stumbling block here was, presumably, that I was inadequately empathetic and 
congruent, unable to remain authentic in the face of advances. Client-centered theory 
makes great demands of the therapist as a person; whether a truly authentic and congruent 
therapist would be equipped to negotiate murky ethical waters begs the question. The 
destination is described, but obstacles to getting there are not addressed. Certainly within 
Rogerian therapy's interpretative framework her help-seeking behaviour suggests an 
ability to idetify potential conditions for growth, and to make self-directed and 
constructive change. But what if, as was apparently the case for many therapists in the 
study by Pope et al (1987), the therapist's genuineness and acceptance are distorted by 
misguided ethics, desires, or fears? 
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Training and supervision in the theory may not model the requisite non-judgmental 
attitude. I consulted an experienced Rogerian counsellor, who was evidently 
uncomfortable with the fact that I was experiencing confusion. I had been unable to 
remain nonjudgmental and empathetic, and so was the therapist I consulted. Rogerians 
would argue that I am pathologizing both the client and myself, and there is some justice 
in this. My distrust of their project, however, stems from a perception that in a sense they 
subscribe to a pretense of objectivity and authority little less pervasive and logocentric 
than that of the Psychodynamic theorists. Their faith in my benevolence and the client's 
capacity to seek healing may gloss over a spectrum of other motives and misconceptions. 
Where the analysts place their faith in the accuracy of reason, the humanists seem to rest 
everything on the spotlessness of everyone's motives, and on a shared and objective 
paradigm of health and growth. 
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b. Postmodern Themes: 
i. Male Help Seeking 
Related to this is the issue of my own ability of willingness to address the issue, seek 
advocacy, risk censure. Good & Wood (1995) found a strong relationship between Male 
Gender Role Conflict (MGRC) (essentially the desire to meet traditional standards of 
'masculine' behaviour) and resistance to help seeking among college males. Further, 
there is evidence that particularly strong MGRC may preclude help seeking regardless of 
the level of psychological distress (Good et al., 1996). While outside the scope of this 
paper, it is worth considering that my own failure to access resources may have been in 
some way informed by gender role. The proportion of counsellors who feel it is ethical to 
continue working when too distressed to be effective is 7%, according to Pope et al. 
(1987). 
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ii. Transference and Attribution 
I was conscious that in the early case histories of the psychodynamic model, such 
transferences were almost anticipated. In attribution theory, people are said to attribute 
causes to novel stimuli to regain "a sense of predictability or control over their 
environments" (Lopez, p.310). According to self-verification theory, people seek to enter 
or create social conditions that confirm their self-conceptions (Swann, 1983). Should I 
have adopted such a stance? At the time I felt that the introduction of such therapeutic 
distance have been even more toxically modernist, authoritarian, and male. Again, 
prevailing modernist ethics do not provide guidelines or direct consideration to the 
resolution of issues like this. McGowen & Hart (1990) identify the prevailing (male and 
modernist) paradigm of professional behaviour as based on separation rather than 
attachment, instrumental rather than relational. Conversely, the failure embedded in the 
termination of therapy was a failure to engage the client's voice of attachment and 
relationship. 
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iii. Gender and Agency 
Brown (1990) points out that gender issues in countertransference are typically 
neglected in both research and self-reflection. This blind spot impacts diagnosis, service 
provision, and the counselling relationship. Gender role is a social and 
phenomenological construct, a powerful agent though which identity is both perceived 
and constructed (Brown, 1990). It is an accepted tenet of the Gilligan-Kohlberg debate 
that gender colours moral understanding. The traditionally privileged male-gendered 
moral voice has been the agent of the prevailing prescriptive ethical dicta, to the 
detriment of practitioners of either gender. 
The prevalence of sex bias in counselling practice remains an open question in 
research literature (Simonet al., 1992). Such questions have expanded in the last decade 
to include more detailed consideration of the impact of broader gender-related issues such 
as counselor reaction to client gender role. The values, relational styles, and vocational 
descriptors that define counselling are coherent with values identified as 'feminine', 
rendering the practice and receipt of counselling a 'closed book' to men (Simonet al., 
1992). 
The present failure of the literature to investigate gender issues in reflective practice 
may be in itself sexually biased, inasmuch as while a text of the feminist voice is 
evolving there is no corresponding male text. Some may argue that the male voice is not 
absent but invisible by virtue of its historical authority. Conversely, the fact remains that 
if there is a male voice there is no critical explication of it. 
Thoreson et al. (1993) point out that while the male gender role has been the subject 
of considerable attention in psychological research, this has not been reflected in the 
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relationship of the male gender role to the counselling process. While societal influences 
on male gender role impact on the experience of counselling, there is a lack of theory and 
research in response to this (Thoreson et al., 1993). The growth in demand for emotional 
expression, interpersonal skills, and sexually responsible professional behaviour has 
perhaps happened too quickly for men to adequately respond, particularly in light of the 
developmental impact of the behaviours modeled by their fathers (Levant, 1990). 
Because gender bias operates unconsciously and at variance to stated belief 
(Thoreson et al, 1993; Brown, 1990), it is necessary that the counsellor enter the 
counselling relationship with deliberate and explicit expectations for gender as an issue 
and a phenomenological lens. As a counsellor, I have become aware of an impact of 
gender-role expectations from peers, supervisors, and clients. Setting aside for the 
moment the role of countertransference in my experience of a client's or counsellor's 
gender, my own gender role has been a distinct variable in transference. The client's 
expressed perception of me as authoritative or sexual recapitulates her experiences of 
maleness. The expectations in crisis work echoed this; males in the field are a rare 
resource, to be reserved for the most violent and unresponsive clients. While I might feel 
discomfort at the implicit attributions, postmodem thought demands that the client's 
construction of my gendered behaviours be privileged. The alternative is an assertion of 
counsellor objectivity. This raises certain highly problematic issues for traditional ethics. 
While motivated no doubt in part by inclination and in part by fear of censure, my 
decision to initiate termination of counselling with my client rose at least partly from a 
disinclination to trust her ability to safeguard her own best interests. While in the normal 
practice of counselling it may be possible to avoid a prescriptive 'I know what's best' 
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relationship, ethical issues as currently conceived force a reversion to the modernist 
male-gendered voice. There is a tacit mandate for the counsellor to act alone in 
evaluating the risk for abuse. Alertness to gender as a cultural construct is a prerequisite 
of the reflective voice; gender attributions themselves are integral to voice. 
Professional identity, presumably an object of counsellor education, is shaped and 
informed by the student's experience of their gender and culture as they interact with the 
culture of counselling. If this culture is prescriptive, mainstream and modernist, the 
student may be marginalized. The diversity of the values and paradigms presented in 
training will determine how the student integrates with a professional role (McGowen & 
Hart, 1990). 
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c. Non-standard Theoretical Responses 
I have highlighted the apparent absence of theories and research within counselling 
which might meaningfully inform discussion of the three-fold dilemma identified; the 
failure of training to prepare me for the ethical issue, the ethical decision itself, and the 
inadequacy of supervision to redress the deficits of training and literature. While there are 
likewise no theories I have been able to identify outside mainstream counselling literature 
which address the problem any better than the theories 'inside' the literature, there are 
certainly some which support my perception that there is at least an issue at hand. They 
are various voices or readings peripheral to counselling, but they helped to frame my 
questions. 
Existential therapy is a philosophical guide to the practitioner's reading of client 
narratives and authentication of client voices; it is not an internally defended system of 
practice and treatment. For N., the need for therapy was certainly expressed as a need for 
direction, strength, and substance in life. She did not pathologize her own concerns or 
identify a need for healing; she seemed rather to wonder very deeply where things in her 
life could go next. Children, school, and part-time work had all failed to pierce the 
existential vacuum of her oddly privileged and picaresque lifestyle. The relationship she 
offered was a sharing of the activities she herself found ultimately unsatisfying; clubs, 
concerts, travel. Perhaps any therapy could describe her issues equally validly, but 
existential thought at least does not either deify or utterly negate the full personhood of 
the therapist. My own frustration was with seemingly irreconcilable conflicts between 
protecting the client and ethical termination of therapy; between personal honesty and the 
structure of supervision; between the security of conventional theory and the allure of 
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deconstruction. Isolated by supervision, confused about my values, unable to identify the 
therapist that I wanted to be, my own deepest emotional and cognitive issues were the 
anxiety of alienation as I looked for professional insight and guidance, and the burden of 
self-awareness and responsibility as I weighed the client's untenable demands. The allure 
of mainstream theory is precisely that it neatly avoids such anxiety-provoking issues. 
Faithful adherence to an interpretative framework rewards the practitioner with the 
assurance that those who question analysis are repressed, those who question humanism 
are not congruent, those who question faith are sinners, and so on. The refusal to accept 
this frosty comfort is central to both existential thought and the kind of reflective practice 
which is core to the supervised student's attempt to uncover their shortcomings and 
support and further their professional growth. My plodding and dogged persistence in 
dissecting this experience can be traced to my own conviction that inaction or abrogation 
of responsibility were untenable decisions. It is easy to say that one would always do the 
right thing; this experience was profound and fearsome because I did not know what the 
right thing was, let alone whether I would want to do it. I did know, however, that blind 
obedience to a prescriptive code on the one hand, or to my own desires to help (or 
experience affection) on the other hand, were neither of them truly responsible. The 
security of dependance on a code and the escape of immersion in need and appetite both 
constitute and avoidance of choice and a sublimation of identity. 
Existential theory informs this dilemma, but I wouldn't suggest that it simply 
validates my experience. In many ways it constitutes for me a meaningful and 
constructive critique of the decisions I made and the interpretative biases I laboured 
under, the 'bad faith' I acted in. I feared that my future decisions were in a sense fragile, 
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that I would recapitulate past selfishness or lay a future course for blind obedience based 
on that one event. I failed to remain in the moment with N. and work in the present 
because of preoccupation with what would happen in the future. My perception of my 
own inability to find a truly ethical and caring solution was allowed to challenge my 
worth. 
If one applies the rigorous tenets of existential thought to both client and counsellor, 
there is a certain symmetry. If N. blamed her father for her problems, well, I was eager to 
wash my hands of responsibility for my role in her life. 
The growing body of literature applying the tools of post-modem social criticism 
provides ways of framing the problems surrounding the issue at hand. Traditional 
theories, conversely, have a kind of egocentrism and univocality which implies that any 
failure of interpretation, any ethical stumbling block, is located within the malpractice or 
misinterpretation of the therapist. Perhaps most systems have a pretence of internal 
consistency that rewards only the faithful. As long as one accepts the aegis of 
psychodynamic thought, for instance, ethical hurdles are simply interesting defences 
arising out of the client's transference. The challenge that they represent actual 
shortcomings of theory and training, genuine responses to the therapeutic milieu, is not a 
permitted reading of events. Fear of reprisal or loss of status is consistent with the 
instrumental values and the prescriptive ethics of positivistic science that often sees codes 
as a concession, an insurance rather than an integrated and personal social response. The 
dominant voice or authority of valuing was the traditional naturalistic concept of control 
of the situation, domination of the client and one's own fears. My own values and 
experiences were marginalized as subjective, the objective being the paradigm of the 
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treatment model and the text of the client's narrative. This implies hierarchical rather than 
equal relationships; the therapist is a more authoritative determinant of meaning than the 
client, the professional community more authoritative than the therapist, and the model 
itself more authoritative than any liveing proponent or interpreter- an untenable illusion 
of external validation, totalizing and foundationalist. 
The peril of post-modem criticism, in my mind, is that while it is an empowering 
voice when used as exploratory and descriptive tool, it lacks a ceratin impetus to change, 
leveling all readings to the same absence of authority. Post-modernism can be an agency 
of cynicism and despair, divorced as it is from any moral push beyond a certain call to 
liberation. I am bothered by the can of worms this kind of wholesale subjectivity opens; 
there is certainly an incompleteness or lack of rigour in my endorsement of 
deconstruction. As an end in itself, it builds nothing. It does not solve dilemmas; it 
identifies and removes the barriers to their expression and solution. In that sense, it is a 
means that justifies the end. It is better to challenge existing biases and criticize the moral 
confusion of current supervision and ethical codes, even if it takes a while to rebuild 
some sensible system in the wake of the destruction. 
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6. Chapter Six: Conclusion 
There is within counselling literature a limited but rapidly growing body of work in 
the areas of postmodem theory, professional ethics, gender biases, and practitioner 
insight and experience. No research attention has yet been given to postmodem ethical 
theories, practitioner experience of ethical issues, training and supervision deficits in the 
area of ethics, or the importance of gender-related experience differences among 
counsellors rather than clients. 
"The integrity and continuing development of a profession depend on the profession's 
willingness to examine the ethical implications of its activities, to establish standards to 
which it holds itself accountable, and to implement strategies to foster ethical behavior" 
(Pope et al., 1993, p. 335). 
My own case of demonstrated to me the failure of the modernist aspects of theory, 
literature, or supervision adequately to equip me for an ethical dilemma. While 
inappropriate relationships receive considerable attention now in prescriptive codes of 
ethics, there are two grave weaknesses in the current state of ethical education. 
First, it is open to question whether prescriptive codes work, or on what moral levels 
they operate, considering the small but alarming number of counsellors who persist in 
views many find exploitative and repugnant. 
Second, while existing codes may delineate unacceptable practices, existing training 
responds to these issues only on the level of 'don't do that'. With the growth of reflective 
practice and attention to counselling process, it is important to explore the impact of 
ethical dilemmas on counsellors. There is a need for open dialogue how counsellors are 
addressing ethical problems on emotional, cultural, and phenomenological levels. 
Counselling literature has embraced feminist criticisms of its largely modernist and 
patriarchal practice. It has begun to attend more explicitly to the ways in which client 
gender impacts the counselling experience. That counsellor gender should be so 
dramatically excluded from consideration is startling given the perception that one sex 
dominates the culture of counselling, while the other holds disproportionate power. 
52 
It is clear that males are more likely to abuse their relationship with clients, or to 
report such abuse; they are also more likely to see such behaviour as acceptable. There is 
as yet no voice in the literature for male counsellors struggling with ethical challenges, or 
with the modernist dynamics of transference and countertransference that foster those 
challenges. 
We are keenly aware of the pervasive impact of gender, but as with ethics we are all 
too inclined to assume that knowledge has somehow inoculated us as practitioners, that 
psychologists do not have a psychology. 
The postmodern ethicist Zygmunt Bauman (1993) predictably rejects the notion of 
universal ethical codes. He maintains, however, that certain ethical perspectives are 
tenable under the postmodern rubric; self-examination, self-sacrifice, and sensitivity to 
the fact that actions and thoughts may be right in one context, and wrong in another. He 
further argues that one may reject universal principles, and yet continue to strive to make 
moral choices- continue to try to live morally and harmoniously with others. The ethics 
of postmodernism, he holds, is to examine the variant reasoning between different 
practices and codes. It is not surrender of the quest to be moral in exchange for 
relativism, but an ongoing inquiry into the nature of accountability (p. 27). 
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